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ABSTRACT  
 
Following independence, the Indian state, with fresh memories of the communal 
violence that marked the partition of the subcontinent, committed itself to an 
unprecedented experiment of actualising the ideal of multiculturalism as a 
cornerstone of the nation and the most important basis of its legitimacy. The 
legitimacy of the state structure was based on the twin principle of individual rights 
and protection of minorities. This entailed a constitutional design committed to 
denying hegemony to any religion. Subsequently, as the message of democracy 
spread, this gave rise to many new problematic issues. Ethnic and national 
minorities challenged the state and its capacity to accommodate conflicting 
identities by demanding neutrality as well as genuine recognition and active 
support for their culture and religion. The essay examines this contested character 
of India's constitutionally guaranteed multiculturalism on the basis of the history of 
state formation, the freedom movement, the uncertainty of the ultimate nature of 
divinity in Hinduism, and thereby, illustrates how post-colonial India was able to 
devise a series of concrete institutions and policies in order to work her way 
towards new conceptions of the rights and status of minorities. Thus, the specific 
case of India’s theoretically fuzzy multiculturalism and the abstract issue of 
accommodation are juxtaposed to some existing measures of the Constitution of 
India as well as some survey data of about ten thousand men and women shortly 
after the parliamentary elections of 1996. Drawing on aspects of India's political 
culture and the debate on Hindu theology, the essay suggests that contrary to the 
spectre of the rise of Hindu 'fundamentalism', India presents a relatively successful 
case of the growth of a multicultural nation, ensconced within of a post-colonial, 
democratic state. 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the panel on "The Performance of the 
Indian State: Cultural Accommodation and Economic Development", at the conference of 
the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, March 13, 1999. I am grateful Alex Fischer and 
Clemens Spieß for their comments. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
In Language, Religion and Politics in North India, the prescient and paradigmatic 
study of the role of politics in the articulation and encapsulation of identity within 
the framework of the post-colonial state, Paul Brass (1974) traced the origin of 
ethnic movements to elite entrepreneurship. This argument, subsequently 
developed as the instrumental approach in his Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory 
and Comparison (1991), distinguished itself from the primordial view with the 
assertion that in the world of ethnic politics there are no givens: ethnic politics is 
made, not born. While Brass assiduously distinguishes himself from the rational 
choice approach (1991:16), and argues instead in favour of the superiority of an 
instrumental approach1 that recognises the role of culture as a constraint on utility 
maximisation, the issue still remains why in some situations people consider it 
worth their while to kill or die for what many others in similar situations see as 
merely symbolic. While on the whole transactional politics has held the ground and 
the Indian state has gone from strength to strength in terms of its ability to 
accommodate the cultural demands of challenging regional, local and 'minority' 
leaders, every now and then, an Amritsar in 1984 or an Ayodhya in 1992, alert us 
to the theoretical puzzle that underpins instrumental theory. 
Instead of concentrating on the theoretical underpinnings of the politics of 
ethnicity2 this essay aims at presenting an empirical case for India as a 
multicultural state, one where the fortuitous presence of pre-independent liberal 
institutions and their post-independence broadening and deepening as a 
consequence of assertive political transaction have produced a thriving 
multicultural society. However, as the essay argues on the basis of evidence from 
Indological sources, some idiosyncratic features specific to Hinduism have 
facilitated the establishment of a multicultural society in India. It concludes with a 
restatement of the critical role of the perception of empowerment on the part of 
competing communities as a key to multiculturalism. 
                                                 
1 Brass (1991:10) says that his arguments ‘fall short of the most extreme instrumentalist 
views associated with some proponents of rational choice theory, who transform all 
choices, including cultural ones, into economic choices. My aim is in no way to disregard 
or discard the cultural forms, values and practices of distinctive ethnic groups as 
unimportant. On the contrary, my purpose is to show that political and economic elites who 
make use of ethnic group attributes are constrained by the beliefs and values which exist 
within the group and which limit the kinds of appeals which can be made’. While the 
reasoning that underpins rational choice theory suggests expected utility maximisation as 
the main decision making norm, there is no attempt to reduce all utility to the economic. 
Rationality consists of the ordering of preferences and not preferences per se. As such, 
there is no contradiction between the position that Brass attributes to himself and that of 
RCT. For further clarification of the application of rational choice theory with regard to the 
cultural and historical context in which the individual is placed, see Subrata K. Mitra, 
Culture and Rationality (1999). 
2 Interested readers may wish to refer to Subrata K. Mitra, ‘The Rational Politics of Cultural 
Nationalism’ (1995) and Subrata K. Mitra, ‘What is Happening to the Political Science of 
Ethnic Conflict?’(1996). 
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Rather than describing India as a multi-national or multi-ethnic state (as in 
Brass 1974), the essay prefers the concept of multiculturalism. Both nation and 
ethnicity, despite declarations of instrumentalists to the contrary, give the 
impression of permanent structures where as culture retains its fluidity with 
comparative ease. However, multiculturalism, whose normative ideal requires the 
active coexistence of different cultures (as different from their mere tolerance, let 
alone the policy of benign neglect), as we shall see later in this essay, in practice if 
not in abstract theory, it lacks empirical precision. Drawing both on individual 
rights and group rights, multiculturalism in practice can lead to a veritable 
explosion of the public sphere of the state, with every shade of identity demanding 
equal representation. While in theory it is the veritable holy grail of contemporary 
liberalism, its practical implications are the nemesis of liberalism at the 
philosophical level. The liberal conviction that deep cultural and religious 
differences can be solved through the institutional mechanisms of the state is 
questioned by such events as the violence that accompanied the publication of the 
Satanic Verses in Great Britain, the Islamic head scarf in French state schools, the 
naturalisation of Turks in Germany or the white flight from the inner city in the 
USA. That such issues are accommodated within the legal and political processes 
of the stable liberal democracies rather than necessarily spilling over to bloody 
riots or terrorism of the kind one witnesses in Eastern Europe or Northern Ireland, 
has more to do with the superior force at the command of the state and the 
dominant social groups than with the superior arguments at the disposal of either. 
Seen through the eyes of the aggrieved parties in the above disputes, the legitimacy 
of the liberal state remains essentially contested.  
If the Indian Republic at fifty is high on the agenda of the multiculturalist then 
it is not because of her poverty and mass illiteracy but in spite of them. India 
attracts attention because of the daring with which the post-colonial state adopted 
the values of multiculturalism as its salient goals, and its occasional and visible 
failure, thanks again to the transparency of her legal and political process, to live 
up to the same objectives. What can the Indian state, traumatised by its failure to 
protect the Babri mosque of Ayodhya from destruction by a mob of Hindu fanatics 
on the fateful day of December 6, 1992 and subsequently, caught between the 
double bind of majoritarian democracy and the absence of a tradition of the 
toleration of difference3 which has tempered the potential excesses of majority rule 
in the west, offer to the world-wide debate on multiculturalism, either by the way 
of indigenous concepts or cross-cultural theory? To put it bluntly, judging from the 
opinions and actions of her people with regard to issues that define the communal 
fault lines of her society, does the talk of a multicultural nation in India make 
sense?4 
                                                 
3 Embree (1990:25) questions the image of Hindu society as one based on absorption, 
synthesis and toleration of differences and attributes the endurance of Indian society in 
terms of its ability to 'encapsulate' other cultures which makes it 'possible for many 
civilizations to live side by side'. But then, he comments wryly, ‘encapsulation is neither 
toleration, absorption, nor synthesis’. 
4 The issue is raised by India's vocal left as well as by students of Indian religion, see 
(Vanaik: 1997) for the former. Heinrich von Stietencron articulates the misgivings of many 
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In raising the question in the specific context of India, this essay also joins the 
general debate on the capacity of the liberal state and its institutions to 
accommodate the competing demands of theological and cultural differences and 
collective historical memories of oppression. The general debate in itself is vast. It 
is only briefly alluded to in this essay for the purpose of setting the terms of 
analysis. Its main thrust is on the empirical forms that the issue of multiculturalism, 
and secularism which is used as its surrogate concept in Indian political discourse, 
have taken from the early years following independence. 
Drawing on aspects of India's political culture and the debate on Hindu 
theology, the essay suggests that contrary to the spectre of the rise of Hindu 
'fundamentalism', India presents a relatively successful case of the growth of a 
multicultural nation, ensconced within of a post-colonial, democratic state. The 
essay examines this argument on the basis of the history of state formation, the 
freedom movement, the uncertainty of the ultimate nature of divinity in Hinduism. 
The abstract issue of accommodation is juxtaposed to some concrete measures of 
the Constitution of India as well as some survey data5 with regard to four salient 
issues from contemporary Indian politics which are significant for the debate on 
multiculturalism in India. 
 
T H E  P O L I T I C A L  C O N T E X T  O F  T H E  D E B A T E  
 
How does a society segmented on the basis of tribe, caste, religion, language and a 
number of other considerations institutionalise itself into a multicultural state? 
What institutions or policies will promote this objective in the context of a post-
colonial state? In the wake of the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party to power in the 
central government at the head of a coalition, and its recent attempts to 'Indianise' 
education, few questions polarise Indians as much as the nature of the Indian nation 
and its relationship to the post-colonial state. Unlike economic development which 
became the main issue of public debate immediately after the achievement of 
independence, the issue of nationhood in post-colonial India came into the 
mainstream of national politics only in the 1980s. Compared to her South Asian 
neighbours India is very much a case apart in terms of the comparative lateness of 
                                                                                                                            
German Indologists: ‘The ideology of nationalism, imported from Europe and now 
instrumentalised for the purpose of creating a 'national' Hindu religion to the detriment of 
'minorities', seems to be bringing about a change in the much praised Hindu religious 
tolerance’ (1997: 28). The cultural policies of the central government have sparked a 
national debate, see (Singh: 1998). 
5 The attitudinal data on legitimacy and nation-formation, based on a survey of a 
representative sample of about ten thousand men and women shortly after the parliamentary 
elections of 1996, presented in the last section of the essay should provide further insights 
into the process that provides a bridge between the post-colonial state and the people. These 
empirical observations question the pessimistic prognosis of some historians who have 
declared such a mission of bridge building between the post-colonial present and the pre-
colonial past through the mediation of the institutions of the modern state as a doomed 
project. The data were collected by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, 
in May-June 1996 shortly after the parliamentary election on the basis of face-to-face 
interviews with a sample of ten thousand men and women representing the Indian 
electorate. 
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the public debate on nationhood. Unlike in neighbouring Pakistan, Bangladesh or 
Sri Lanka, right from the outset the Constitution of India did not go far enough in 
defining the core beliefs of the nation.6 Though, as mentioned before, the supreme 
law of the land spoke both of the rights of individuals and primordial groups but 
provided no consistent guide lines as to why the state should support one or the 
other in a specific context.7 However, five decades of full, free and uninhibited 
competitive politics following independence has succeeded in putting the 
ambiguity implicit in this fuzzy definition of multiculturalism to test, forcing an 
alternative in the form of a nation based on Hindutva.8 That alternative is the 
source of great anxiety to the 'secularists' who see in such arguments a dangerous 
portent towards the rise of Hindu 'fascism'. But, this secularist argument on its own 
does not advance a theory of a multicultural state in India. For, besides 
mechanically repeating that India is a secular state and should remain so, the 
secularist lobby offers no satisfactory theory of the nature of the Indian nation and 
its relation to India's culture and religions. 
The relevance and urgency of the issue for contemporary India can hardly be 
over emphasised. From the nineteen eighties Indian politics has polarised 
dangerously on the issue of religion and politics. Fuzzy concepts like 'unity in 
diversity' as the cultural basis of a tolerant pluralism in India, or the Congress 
System, based on consensus and accommodation are no longer seen as acceptable 
and sufficient guarantees of India's national unity and integrity as a state.9 At heart 
of the issue today is: what kind of nation underpins the state in India, and, what 
resources do the post-colonial state and society in India possess in order to sustain 
multicultural nationhood in India? 
 The essay questions the image of contemporary India as a society of resurgent 
Hinduism that threatens liberal institutions. Though, five decades after the end of 
colonial rule and the experience of a functioning democracy, Indians do not any 
longer consider their perception in the west to be a determining influence in their 
perception of themselves nor of their political choices. In a comparative essay 
where larger social processes are analysed in terms of the choices of individuals 
and groups that constitute those societies, we need to look briefly at the changing 
perception of India and Indians in the west over the past centuries in order to be 
able to question these 'orientalist' constructions. Vasco da Gama's discovery of the 
                                                 
6 The basic values of the Constitution are defined in the Preamble. The word 'secular' was 
added subsequent to the formation of the Constitution, through an amendment in 1976. 
7 Thus, while the rights of the individual to equality were to be seen as a fundamental value, 
milk cattle were to be protected in the interest of the agrarian economy and the tradition of 
devadasis to be suppressed for the sake of morality and religious minorities were to be 
provided for with regard to their separate educational establishments. 
8 This is defined as the common denominator of Indian culture by its proponents who insist 
on adherence to its values as the basis of citizenship in India. The Indian Supreme Court 
has accepted Hindutva as a manifestation of Indian culture rather than being synonymous 
with the Hindu religion. 
9 Of the two mainstays of the fuzzy Indian nationalism, 'unity in diversity', the main 
ideological device, lies in the rubble of the Babri mosque and the second, the 'Congress 
System', which served as its institutional base, after successive electoral defeats, now firmly 
belongs to Indian history. 
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direct sea route to India five centuries ago is a useful vantage point from where to 
ask this question. This was a crucial turning point in world history which 
introduced a major discontinuity in the political historiography of this much visited 
and often 'discovered' land. Until then, each external visitation to India - Greek, 
Chinese, Arab or Central Asian - was part of a larger project, ranging between 
plunder and conversion to trade, pilgrimage and sometimes, simple intellectual 
curiosity. But Vasco da Gama's visit was qualitatively different, for it coincided 
with the rise of European imperialism in terms of historical conjuncture. As such, 
this last visit also drew a line beyond which India would be constructed chiefly by 
Europeans and for Europeans, often with the help of Indian clerks, sepoys, 
academics and moralists - working in the interest of the Empire.10 
 Historically, however, though the process of imperial dominance of India 
started with the Portuguese, they were themselves beaten at the imperial game by 
others destined to take the project of European domination to its crowning glory. 
But they certainly contributed to the laying of its foundation by constructing Indian 
society in terms of locally based and hierarchically related castas as a categorical 
opposite of the European ideal of moral equality and Christian brotherhood.11 Later 
theorists refined these categories and invented the broader principles that wove 
these castas together as cognate groups and produced the grand edifice of the 
eternal, organic, spiritual and complex India. The next steps in that process of 
demonising India, and to a lesser degree, Pakistan, is to describe these populations, 
drunk on the power of majoritarian democracy, as the harbingers of the Clash of 
Civilizations12, and now, in the wake of the nuclear tests of May 1998 in South 
Asia, of the Hindu bomb and its Muslim counterpart in Pakistan. As the essay 
argues below, post-colonial India, conscious of the political reality behind the 
orientalist construction of India, devised a series of institutions and policies in 
order to work her way towards liberal multiculturalism. 
 
T H E  T H E O R E T I C A L  F R A M E  O F  T H E  I N Q U I R Y :  F U Z Z Y  
M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S M  A N D  T H E  P O S T - C O L O N I A L  S T A T E  
 
The nascent Indian state, with fresh memories of the Hindu-Muslim riots that 
marked independence and the partition of India, attempted to find an institutional 
solution for the problem of the accommodation of religious differences within the 
institutions of the modern state through the twin concepts of sarva dharma 
                                                 
10 See Sullivan (1993). Looking back, one marvels at the sheer power of the imperial rulers 
to persuade everybody concerned including themselves of the legitimacy of their presence 
on alien soil. Indeed, at its height, the imperial domination of India was so powerful that 
even the nationalist movement would be at its wit's end in distancing itself from the 
ideological objectives of the Empire, lacking the ontological and epistemological tools with 
which to rediscover the links with a largely forgotten past. 
11 An enduring part of this bedrock is caste, a major tool in the armoury of the orientalist. In 
describing Indian society as that of castas, the Portuguese had in mind lumps of internally 
cohesive but externally fragmented social groups, rather like types of grapes. For details see 
Hust (1996: 20). 
12 The reference here is to the book under the same title by Samuel P. Huntington (1996). 
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samabhava (equal attitudes towards all religions) and dharma nirapekshata 
(religious neutrality). Secondly, it made every effort to acknowledge the salience of 
individual rights to freedom of religion and equality before the law, and group 
rights to cultural and religious practices in its charter of fundamental rights. The 
post-colonial state thus made attempts to accommodate both the fact of the 
existence of several religions which played a salient role in the social life of her 
citizens and to assuage the apprehension of non-Hindus of a possible Hindu 
majoritarian dominance. This created what can be termed a fuzzy notion of 
multiculturalism, to distinguish it from radical multiculturalism which required the 
state to explicitly acknowledge the existence of plural identities in the public 
sphere, and from various forms of mono-culturalism which promotes the culture of 
one social group to the detriment of others by putting its language, religion and 
status to a hegemonic position within the structure of law and administration. 
The post-colonial state in India considered its solution of fuzzy 
multiculturalism to be an optimal solution for the political conditions that 
surrounded its inception. The founding fathers of the Constitution of India 
considered the multicultural ideal crucial to the success of a liberal democratic 
regime in India. While some like Nehru saw in this concept a magic formula for 
culturally different and politically conscious groups to share a common space as 
fellow citizens, the attitude of other influential leaders like Patel and Hindu 
nationalist parties like the Bharatiya Jan Sangh ranged between scepticism and 
hostility with regard to fuzzy multiculturalism. But, in the euphoria of 
independence and the institutionalisation of the fuzzy view of multiculturalism in 
the concept of 'secularism' which became the ruling ideology of India under the 
rule of the Congress party, the key questions regarding the lack of logical rigour 
and empirical validity of the very concept of multiculturalism and its applicability 
to India were rarely raised. The prognosis of D E Smith, that clarity would emerge 
out of the confusion surrounding the ambiguities of secularism effectively conveys 
the general ethos of the period: 
 
There is a good chance that twenty years from now, many of India's 
constitutional anomalies regarding the secular state will have 
disappeared. It is reasonable to expect that by that time there will be a 
uniform civil code and that Hindu and Muslim law, as such, will have 
ceased to exist. Legislation having already dealt with the most serious 
abuses in Hindu religion there will be little need for further 
interference by the state (1963: 14). 
 
In retrospect, however, underneath the superficial consensus on the meaning and 
applicability of the concept of 'secularism' to Indian conditions, controversy raged 
from the outset. The inconclusive nature of the 'cow slaughter' issue during the 
1950s, the incomplete character of the project of a unified personal law for India,13 
the 'text book' controversy of the first Janata Party governments and the celebrated 
Ram Janambhoomi issue from the nineteen eighties which ultimately led to the 
                                                 
13 See Mitra and Fischer, forthcoming. 
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violent clash of Ayodhya all bear testimony to this deeply embedded problem 
(Mitra 1991).14 At issue is the inconclusive nature of the solution to the problem of 
incorporating multiple religious identities within the structure of the state. While 
short term calculations of political opportunists certainly play a role in giving 
particular salience and virulence to each of these issues, their consistent appearance 
in time and space point towards factors that go beyond the exigencies of everyday 
politics. Secularists like Nehru sought to reduce the salience of this problem on the 
national political agenda by making a non-issue out of it, or by promoting the 
spread of 'rational thinking' through science and technology and social reform 
which they fondly hoped would make these traditionalist opposition to modernity 
disappear. But, looking back to the fifties and considering from that vantage point 
all that has happened since in this specific area, one is inescapably driven to the 
conclusion that in terms of its political significance and philosophical basis, the 
issue multiculturalism rightfully belongs to the agenda of the high politics of values 
and institutions of the post-colonial state in India. 
 Why did the Founding Fathers of the Constitution adopt the fuzzy view of 
multiculturalism as the founding stone of the project of nation building? This 
section, which inquires into this issue first raises the question of state-society 
relations which lies at the core of the problem of legitimacy in post-colonial 
societies.15 Three questions are encapsulated within this complex theme: how does 
the state emerge in a post-colonial context; which specific function the nation is 
expected to perform within this specific process of state formation and, finally, 
what is the likelihood that the resultant nation would be multicultural in the end? 
Since the specific case of India is discussed in the context of the general theory of 
multiculturalism, it is important here to refer briefly to the conceptual issues 
involved. 
 
M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S M  A N D  T H E  P O S T - C O L O N I A L  S T A T E  
 
Multiculturalism, a hallmark of contemporary political correctness, often remains 
in practice more a statement of faith in western liberal societies than a theoretical 
tool with which to analyse social and economic policy at home and abroad. There 
are, in this respect, strong parallels in the nature of the debate on multiculturalism 
in India and western liberal democracies. In India, as in stable democracies, the 
proffered solutions that advocates of multiculturalism suggest are federalism, 
consociationalism and legislation that cater to the needs of minorities. The stance 
taken by the advocates of these solutions vary greatly as well. The advocates of 
radical multiculturalism argue in favour of the contentious public assertion of 
difference where as those on the liberal side of the spectrum opt for a less 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of the debate surrounding cow slaughter and the Hindu Code Bill, Lloyd 
and Susanne Rudolph, ‘Cultural Policy, the Textbook Controversy and Indian Identity’ 
(1982); for the textbook controversy Arun Shourie, Indian Controversies: Essays on 
Religion in Politics (1993) and K.R. Malkani, The Politics of Ayodhya and Hindu-Muslim 
Relations (1993) for the conflict surrounding the birthplace of Rama and its implications 
for Indian politics. 
15 Some arguments that follow are taken from Subrata K. Mitra (1991b). 
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conflictual approach. However, all those in favour of a multicultural nation ask for 
a solution which brings different groups together within a larger structure of 
synergy rather than merely assimilating all those that are considered marginal, 
relative to a politically constructed core. But the theoretical complexities that 
underpin the concept of the multicultural nation are often not stated in explicit 
terms. One of these complexities is the relationship between the legitimacy of the 
state and its capacity to accommodate conflicting identities. 
 The state is, above all, a political organisation possessing the four main 
characteristics of sovereignty, government, territory and a population. But over and 
above these formal characteristics is the ability of this organisation more than any 
other political body in society to have the final control over the lives of its citizens. 
It is only the state that has the ultimate right over life. Its monopoly of legitimate 
violence entitles the state to execute a citizen guilty of the offence of treason, or to 
order its citizens to war and risk death. But, even if these measures appear extreme, 
a state properly speaking needs to be able to do more than that.16 The modern 
nation-state needs to have control over the political and the moral instruments with 
which to provide a comprehensive theory of legitimacy. For the protagonists of this 
view of the state, chiefly associated with Tilly's (1975) The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe (though his subsequent work (1985) takes a less sanguine 
view of the state), the nation is the chief ally of the state in this project of 
generating legitimacy through an ideological justification of state control. For a 
variety of reasons, this solution was not available to the post-colonial state in India. 
 As a post-colonial state, India after independence was more a state-nation than 
a nation-state, for the institutions of state, very much a part of the British legacy, 
were already in place when the colonial rulers left, having transferred power to an 
English speaking Indian elite. The nation, as a conscious political creation was 
absent from the political discourse of the day. The nation was of course implicitly 
present in the anti-colonial movements that preceded independence but it was, of 
necessity, a thin political construction, not possessing the deep cultural and moral 
unity that characterised the rise of nations in the west. The post-colonial state thus 
needed to build a nation which would then be the repository of the ultimate 
allegiance of the citizens. But which of the many nations that underpinned the 
freedom movement was to be chosen as the core of the state-nation? Faced with 
this question, the Fathers of the Indian Constitution did what the leaders of the 
                                                 
16 The state needs to be able to expect its citizens to volunteer to lay down their lives in its 
defence. The modern state expects to be able to do this, even more than Hobbes's Leviathan 
who could order citizens to war but not to commit suicide. When the authority of the 
Hobbesian sovereign has shrunk to the level where it can no longer guarantee internal 
security or is no longer able to provide incontrovertible evidence that it can protect its 
citizens from shameful defeat and destruction from outside, the citizen is morally free to 
explore other possibilities to get the protection the legal state can no longer guarantee. The 
modern state is able to get past this narrow, mechanical and instrumental construction of 
the state by making its presence appear as part of the larger project of the nation. The 
nation, representing the cultural and moral organisation of the will that also embodies the 
wills of its children, expects this ultimate sacrifice of its members when the need for it 
arises. 
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Freedom Movement before them had done. They remained deliberately vague in 
their formulation of the core values of the Indian nation. 
 As a post-colonial state that has chosen the democratic path to legitimacy, India 
was confronted with a further problem. Post-colonial states like Pakistan started 
with a declared superiority of an official religion but tolerance for other religions. 
In states like Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, and Bangladesh, a state in its own right since 
the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, where the superiority of a specific religion 
did not exist at the outset, subsequent developments established the moral 
superiority of the cultural values of the majority.17 In the case of India, this process 
of the search for the identification of the core values of the state was effectuated by 
a constitutional provision of equality of all faiths and the commitment of the post-
independence regime to this principle. The attempt even to establish Hindi in 
Devanagari script as the national language quickly became an open invitation to the 
different social and cultural groups of India to assert their difference as the opening 
gambit in the oncoming negotiation of their status within the new Republic. The 
Congress Party, based on a political culture of consensus and accommodation, 
acquiesced in these developments and adapted itself to this process for the purpose 
of winning elections. As such, the post-colonial state in India abandoned, at least 
for the time being, the path taken by nineteenth century nation states to pulverise 
cultural differences in the greater cause of the nation. Ironically, just as Nehru's 
regime and the Congress party as its main ruling instrument were resisting the 
attempts to impose Hindi as the national language but giving in cultural symbols 
like language as the basis of regional state formation, the less secure regimes in 
Pakistan and Ceylon were moving in the direction of elevating the status, 
respectively, of Islam and the Urdu language, and, Buddhism and Sinhalese on 
reluctant minorities, respectively, in East Bengal and the Northern Sri Lanka.  
 Nehru anticipated some of the problems of nationhood in his inaugural speech 
to the newly independent country. Nehru's speech, the Tryst with Destiny, delivered 
in his capacity as the recently anointed Prime Minister, still appears fifty years into 
time as both a masterpiece of rhetoric and prescient: 
 
Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes 
when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but 
very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world 
sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which 
comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, 
when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, 
finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the 
pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the 
still larger cause of humanity (cited in Rushdie/West 1997: 1-2, 
emphasis added). 
                                                 
17 Examples are Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where post-independence changes like the 
democratic induction of the 'Sinhala only' policy in Sri Lanka and the 1975 coup in 
Bangladesh which removed secularism from the core values of the constitution, show this 
process in action. 
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At that fateful moment, Nehru, as the leader of the new Republic, committed the 
state to an unprecedented experiment of actualising the value of multiculturalism as 
the cornerstone of the nation and the most important basis of her legitimacy, 
without quite anticipating the problems it was to generate at a later stage.  
 
M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S M  A S  A N  E S S E N T I A L L Y  C O N T E S T E D  
C O N C E P T  
 
The enormity of the political implications of Nehru's rhetoric become clear once 
we look closely at the two meanings of culture suggested by Said in the context 
and conjuncture that frame Nehru's statement. Said defines the two functions of 
culture in terms of the definition of the self, the other and the relationship between 
the two. Culture in this sense implies all those practices, like the arts of description, 
communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the 
economic, social and political realms and that often exist only in aesthetic forms. 
With regard to the definition of the self and its relationship with the other, one can 
envisage three possibilities. First, the other is better; and as such, should be seen as 
superior to the self. A second possibility is that the self is better than the other, 
which is potentially capable of improvement; s/he should be encouraged to learn 
from self. But beyond this relationship of knowledge and power is the possibility of 
the recognition of the moral equality of cultures such that the self and the other 
could learn from one another as equals.18 
The likelihood of a multicultural nation is thus contingent on the definitions 
and perceptions of the self and the other, not as uniform, or substitutable cogs in 
the gigantic machine of the nation-state but as different but related through the 
state and the nation, both of which are located at a higher level where citizens 
actualise their mutually rewarding relation. This ideal, powerfully articulated by 
Martin Heidegger19, is not often met with in practice. Not surprisingly, inter-
cultural relations are often fraught with uncertainty, injecting a corresponding 
degree of uncertainty of a nation state sustaining itself through a concept of 
                                                 
18Said says ‘culture is a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each 
society's reservoir of the best that has been known and thought’. ‘In time, culture comes to 
be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state, this differentiates 'us' from 
'them', almost always with some degree of xenophobia. Culture in this sense is a source of 
identity, and a rather combative one at that, as we see in recent 'returns' to culture and 
tradition. These returns accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behaviour that 
are opposed to the permissiveness associated with such relatively liberal philosophies as 
multiculturalism and hybridity. In the formerly colonised world, these 'returns' have 
produced varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism’ (1994: XIII). 
19 Arvind Sharma (1998: 139) cites from Heidegger to make the point. ‘Poetry and thinking 
meet each other in one and the same only when, and only as long as, they remain distinctly 
in the distinctness of their nature. The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the 
empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves 
toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common 
denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of what differs, through a 
gathering by way of the difference. We can only say 'the same' if we think difference. It is 
in the carrying out and settling of differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes 
to light. The same banishes all zeal always to level what is different into the equal or 
identical. The same gathers what is distinct into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the 
contrary, disperses them into the dull unity of mere uniformity’ (Heidegger, 1971: 218-
219). 
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multiculturalism. As Parekh reminds us ‘the terms 'multicultural' and 
'multiculturalism' have no clear or fixed meaning, often in practice, sliding from 
the descriptive to the normative’ (Parekh 1991). 
 The version of multiculturalism that proves the most direct challenge to liberal 
institutions is radical multiculturalism. The core principle of radical 
multiculturalism as it is often articulated in the United States is the idea of respect 
for cultural, racial and ethnic differences in a manner where it is enjoined on the 
state to provide them with 'equal time' in the public sphere. The principle is far 
more extensive than mere toleration of the other. A radically multicultural society 
‘[...] must allow each of its members to define her identity for herself, by finding 
the group or groups to which she has the closest affinity, and must also allow each 
group to formulate its own authentic set of claims and demands, reflecting its 
particular circumstances. The state must respect and acknowledge these demands 
on an equal basis. It cannot hold up one model of the good life at the expense of 
others, nor may it be its policies on principles of justice that some groups but not 
others regard as legitimate’ (Miller 1991: 131). 
 Thus, to illustrate radical multiculturalism through one of its expressions, we 
have from Young: 
 
Today most gay and lesbian advocates seek not merely civil rights, but 
the affirmation of gay men and lesbians as social groups with specific 
experiences and perspectives. Refusing to accept the dominant 
culture's definition of healthy sexuality and respectable family life and 
social practices, gay and lesbian movements have proudly created and 
displayed a distinctive self-definition and cultures. For gay men and 
lesbians the analogue to racial integration is the typical liberal 
approach to sexuality, which tolerates any behaviour as long as it is 
kept private. Gay pride asserts that sexual identity is a matter of 
culture and politics and not merely 'behaviour' to be tolerated or 
forbidden (cited in Miller 1995: 131). 
 
A direct transposition of the assumptions of radical multiculturalism in the Indian 
context would require a clearing up of the ambiguities and anomalies that surround 
some of the salient issues with regard to cultural and religious conflicts and their 
implications for law and order. Should India have one central set of personal laws 
for all citizens regardless of their religion? Can one place of worship 'belong' to 
different communities? Can Kashmir, an 'integral' part of India, nevertheless have a 
different constitutional status? 
 
 
I N D I V I D U A L  R I G H T S ,  G R O U P  R I G H T S  A N D  
M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S M  
 
In order to cope with these difficulties, the Fathers of the Indian Constitution 
provided for a dual policy of rights. There were rights of individuals, guaranteed 
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most of all in the Fundamental Rights (article 16) but stated explicitly all over the 
Constitution. But there were also rights of groups, particularly those of the 
minorities (article 29). Article 1 of the Constitution, which solemnly declares 
‘India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States’ gives voice to this duality. But, 
ever solicitous to cap what was called 'majority communalism', Nehru's India was 
careful to rein in the free use of the word culture as the basis of the self-definition 
of groups. The realisation of these difficulties led to the innovation of a number of 
institutions such as federalism, various forms of explicit and implicit quotas for 
different communities and the twin principles of secularism as the cornerstone of 
the state's policy towards competing communities and identities. These institutions 
were to be ensconced within a state policy of economic and social reform and a 
state sponsored policy of secularism. Nehru committed the state to this goal in his 
inaugural speech to the post-colonial state, made immortal as 'Freedom at 
Midnight': 
 
We end today a period of ill fortune and India discovers herself again. 
The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of 
opportunity, to the greater triumphs and achievement that await us. 
Are we brave enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and 
accept the challenge of the future? The future is not one of ease or 
resting but of incessant striving so that we may fulfil the pledges we 
have so often taken and the one we shall take today. The service of 
India means the service of the millions who suffer. It means the 
ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of 
opportunity. The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has 
been to wipe every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us, but as 
long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be over 
[...].To the people of India, whose representatives we are, we make an 
appeal to join us with faith and confidence in this great adventure. 
This is no time for petty and destructive criticism, no time for ill will 
or blaming others. We have to build the noble mansion of free India 
where all her children dwell (cited in Rushdie/West 1997: 1-2). 
 
Nehru's rhetoric was full of implicit references to the notions of citizenship and 
rights, and had none of the connotations of the mass, a homogeneous and 
homogenising entity, drunk on the sense of its power and purpose, striking terror in 
those who stand on its path. Nehru spoke on the background of the carnage of 
India's partition, and also of the urgency (as in Cannetti, 1973) of a concerted effort 
to remove mass poverty and ignorance. Democracy, a sense of community and 
modernisation were the fire that would lead the way. The fact that the moral 
equality of man and methodological individualism, with which Nehru planned to 
give a concrete, institutional shape to these ideals originated in cultures foreign to 
India did not matter at that moment of euphoria. For India had already been 
exposed to some of them for the better part of the duration of colonial rule, at least 
in the form of legal values. The most radical of these new institutions, namely the 
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principle of universal adult franchise as the basic principle of legitimacy and 
popular accountability, was very much in the air at least since the 1937 elections. 
The six decades that preceded independence had witnessed a steady, incremental 
extension of the right to vote under the overall hegemony of British colonial rule. 
While these limited experiments had already planted the seeds of mass democracy, 
the extension of franchise to the entire adult population in one fateful moment was 
a bold leap, particularly when one takes into consideration the fact that the 
Constituent Assembly which decided on this momentous step was itself the product 
of restricted franchise. But the measure was in keeping with the spirit of popular 
sovereignty which was the guiding principle of India's freedom movement and 
whose essence Nehru described in his famous oration on 'Freedom at Midnight'. 
 In the event, after five decades of application of universal adult franchise as the 
main ideology of the state, and as such, the preferred instrument of social and 
political change, and democratic accountability as a critical ingredient of the 
principle of governance, India continues to offer hope, but with a lingering sense of 
doubt. The reasons for hope become clear as one browses through the record of her 
achievements since independence. Regular, free and fair elections have been held 
to the legislatures at national and regional levels from 1952 onwards. Participation 
in these elections has been respectable, in comparison to the United States if not to 
continental Europe. The locus of political power has changed as a result of 
elections. The political prominence and control of resources by social groups to 
which power was transferred by the British in 1947 has been successfully 
challenged by subaltern groups in many regions and localities of India. Though the 
state has in many cases initiated these changes through legislation, the incentive 
has often come from the anticipated electoral dividends. There have also been 
occasions when the beneficiaries have themselves forced the hands of the 
government through protest movements and electoral mobilisation. The main 
consequence of these multiple modes of politics has been that five decades after 
independence, India can with some justification claim to have achieved a minimum 
of welfare and food security. In the same vein are the records on inflation and 
social inequalities, the extremes of which have been tamed. And now, with the 
liberalisation of India's economy, international business confidence in India has 
increased considerably compared to the recent past. 
 If Nehru's bold vision has been borne out by the overall success of India's 
democratic record, it has had to contend with persistent mass poverty and illiteracy, 
communal conflagrations and political insurgency. Democracy itself has wilted 
from time to time, but only to bounce back eventually with renewed vigour. In the 
mean time, structural change of the society and the economy has continued to 
progress, even though at an uneven pace. But majoritarian democracy has also 
revived the fear of the mobilisation of the Hindu masses under the banner of 
religion, and counter-mobilisation by the minority religions which structured the 
thinking of colonial administrators in the wake of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, and 
the communal riots that have dotted the landscape since. Nehru, very much a 
product of his times, had no doubts about the necessity of setting 'secular' limits to 
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politics, very much on the pattern of the fuzzy nationalism of the Freedom 
Movement that the Congress led against the Raj. 
 The historians of comparative nationalism must marvel at the tameness of the 
Indian formulation of the national agenda, for the classic cases of nationalism have 
shown ample readiness to crush all challenges to the supremacy of the national 
idea, both from within as well as from without. Nationalism is famously intolerant 
of differences. Similarly, just as colonial rule draws its legitimacy from a hierarchy 
of cultures which puts the masters at the apex, anti-colonial movements are 
intellectually and morally committed to the reversal of this hierarchy. Edward Said 
quotes Jules Harmand (1910), the French theoretician of race, colonialism and 
civilisation: 
 
It is necessary, then, to accept as a principle and point of departure the 
fact that there is a hierarchy of races and civilisations, and that we 
belong to the superior race and civilisation, still recognising that, 
while superiority confers rights, it imposes strict obligations in return. 
The basic legitimisation of conquest over native peoples is the 
conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, 
and military superiority, but our moral superiority. Our dignity rests 
on that quality, and it underlies our right to direct the rest of humanity. 
Material power is nothing but a means to that end (Said 1994: 17). 
 
Partha Chatterjee, in his formulation of the Indian response to British Raj argues 
that the representatives of the colonised people had early decided to beat the 
British at their own game. But this strategy came with a price tag: ‘Nationalism 
sets out to assert its freedom from European domination. But in the very 
conception of its project, it remains a prisoner of the prevalent European 
intellectual fashions’ (1986:10). Thus, Chatterjee argues, the Freedom 
Movement left out the 'less enlightened, and the culturally marginal', from the 
nationalist agenda. But Gandhi and Nehru were aware of the problem. Mahatma 
Gandhi, the Father of the Nation, admonished on August 9, 1942: 
 
[...] Hindustan belongs to all those who are born and bred and who 
have no other country to look to. Therefore, it belongs to Parsis, Beni 
Israels, to Indian Christians, Muslims and other non-Muslims as much 
as to Hindus. Free India will be no Hindu Raj; it will be Indian Raj 
based not on the majority of any religious community but on the 
representatives of the whole people without distinction of religion 
(cited in Sharma 1994: 107). 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated the same point in India Today and Tomorrow: ‘India is 
a common home for all those who live here, to whatever religion they may belong 
[...] they have equal rights and obligations. Ours is a composite Nation’. The 
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composite and inclusive character of the nation is enshrined in the constitution in 
several articles.20 
 When we look at the events that surrounded the birth of the new Republic, one 
question that comes uppermost to the mind is why Indians did accept the 'secular' 
state and the multicultural nationalism that Nehru's regime was offering them. 
There were surely enough grounds to inflame communal passions but they do not 
seem to have affected the secular character of the Constitution, nor the fact that 
having had the choice to leave India for their ‘homeland’ one third of the Muslims 
of India decided to stay on in the country of their birth. In retrospect, one wonders 
how this remarkable historical feat could be possible. Could it possibly be 
accounted for by the collective charisma of the Congress leadership? Or, was it yet 
another indication of Indian passivity? Or, was it a passive acceptance of Jinnah's 
two-nation theory? Finally, can the Indian reaction be seen as an indication of 
multicultural nationalism at a deeper level? Perhaps there was an element of all of 
these, but the latter requires some explanation. The sections below examine the 
roots of the concept of ‘unity in diversity’ which is deeply entrenched in Indian 
tradition from religious and literary sources. 
 
 
U N I T Y  I N  D I V E R S I T Y :  T H E  R E L I G I O U S  R O O T S  O F  
M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S M  I N  I N D I A  
 
Many Indians see the ideals of inclusive nationhood and multiculturalism that 
underpin the constitution and political practice in everyday life as a continuity, and 
as a reflection of unity in diversity, an overarching value that provides coherence to 
the metaphysical universe of Hinduism. This of course is a heuristic device rather 
than a descriptive category, intended to help discover the efforts that people 
sometimes make to bridge the gap between the ideal and the actual. In theoretical 
terms, the concept is deeply problematic both at the epistemological and 
ontological levels. For unity in diversity denotes both the empirical knowledge of 
different cultural modes and their boundaries as well as the legitimacy of their 
difference in terms of the moral equality of the different ways. Implicit in the 
definition of the different modes are also ontological hierarchies, so that, the actual 
determination of the plurality becomes necessarily problematic. Aditya Malik 
illustrates the point with reference to a dialogue from the Brhadarnayaka 
Upanishad as an example of one of the earliest statements on theological plurality 
found in Hinduism: 
 
Then Vidagdha Saklya questioned him, saying: 
‘How many gods are there, Yajnavalkya?’ 
                                                 
20 For example, see Article 325: ‘No person to be ineligible for inclusion in or to claim to 
be included in a special electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste, or sex. There shall 
be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency for election to either House of 
the Legislature of a State and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll of 
claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds only 
of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them’. 
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He answered by (reciting) this invocatory formula: 
‘As many as are mentioned in the invocatory formula in the hymn to the All-
gods - three hundred and three and three thousand and three (=3306)’. 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really (eva), Yajnavalkya?’ 
‘Thirty-three’. 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really, Yajnyavalkya?’ 
‘Six’ 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really, Yajnyavalkya?’ 
‘Three’ 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really, Yajnyavalkya?’ 
‘Two’. 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really, Yajnyavalkya?’ 
‘One and a half’. 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but how many gods are there really, Yajnyavalkya?’ 
‘One’. 
‘Yes’, he said, ‘but which are those three hundred and three and those three 
thousand and three?’ 
Malik (1997: 8-9, fn. 20).21 
 
There are countless regional and local variations on the anecdote narrated above 
that point in the direction of a basic uncertainty about the essential nature of 
divinity that characterises Hinduism. There are sociological factors that reinforce 
this tendency. As von Stietencron (1997) informs us , when a girl marries into a 
family whose kuladevata (family god) is different from that of her family, it is not 
considered unusual for the kuladevata of the girl's family to travel with her and to 
be ritually ensconced in the family shrine of her husband and continued to protect 
her as an isthadevata (personal god). The gramadevata who wields influence over 
the whole village is of course present in a general way and so are any other 
powerful divine figures present in the area who need to be propitiated either to 
enhance their capacity to do good or to forestall any harm that one might encounter 
if an evil spirit is not kept satisfied. The fact that marriages within a specific degree 
of relation are prohibited thus holds the potential for an increase of sacred figures 
with every generation. 
                                                 
21 The 'unity in diversity' idea is present not only in the texts of high Hinduism but in 
popular discourse or folk Hinduism as well. Malik illustrates this with a story: ‘Once a 
Muslim, a Christian, and a Hindu began quarrelling about whose God was the greatest and 
most powerful. In order to prove their respective God's strength, they climbed up onto a 
cliff and decided to jump down one after another. Whoever's God was the most powerful 
would save him from crashing to death against the rocks below. First, the Muslim jumped 
off crying: 'Ya Allah!' Before he could hit the rocks, Allah saved him and he survived. Then 
the Christian stepped off the cliff exclaiming: 'O Lord, our saviour!' He too was protected 
from hitting the rocks. Now it was the Hindu's turn. He uttered God's names, but no one 
came to his rescue and he smashed against the deadly rocks. When he ascended into 
heaven, he went straight to Bhagaban complaining that the Muslim and Christian had been 
saved, so why not him? Bhagaban replied saying: 'Well, first you took Ram's name, then 
Sita's, then Mahadev's then Bhavani's, then Krishna’s, then Radha's, then Hanuman's and 
after that Ganesh's - I was so busy changing my clothes, I didn't have time to rescue you!’. 
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The ability of one sanatana dharma - eternal religion - to be able to integrate 
all these diverse rituals and faiths within an overall structure is the subject of a 
major debate among specialists.22 The fact remains however that lived-in religion 
at the level of everyday life certainly admits of plurality, which is then 
complemented with another popular belief in vasudhwaiva kutumbakam - the 
whole world is one's family. Paradoxically, thus, Hinduism, that most non-
missionary of religions has built into it an appreciation of the universe as it is 
(rather that as it might be under proper religious guidance) that the conventional 
missionary religions like Christianity or Islam are not capable of.  
The accommodation of seeming contradictions within an all-pervading essence 
that both contains and connects differences is seen by many scholars of India as 
quintessential of her culture. Others, more accustomed to understanding India in 
terms of the choices of individuals and groups see the concept of unity in diversity 
more as a cultural ideal rather than as a description of behaviour. Not being 
equipped with a prior belief in the essential unity of India, some of these 
instrumentalists question the very basis of India as a nation, and the likelihood of 
the endurance of the fragile bonds that bind the accidental units that constitute it. 
The question for them is why political reality sometimes fails to live up to the 
normative expectation. Since this issue is often present in everyday political 
discourse and its reflection in fiction, we next turn to the Midnight's Children as an 
example of how the issue is articulated. 
 
 
T H E  L I T E R A R Y  C O N S T R U C T I O N :  I N D I A ,  A  ' P I C K L E D '  
N A T I O N ?  
 
While religion provides a necessary core to identity, it is culture which adds the 
formal articulation and the logic that holds such disparate expressions of identity as 
literature, music, food, taboos and ritual together. Culture, particularly language 
and literature as its handmaidens, provide much greater freedom of self-definition 
than religion. Rushdie's Midnight's Children, offers a window to the literary 
discourse on the concept and form of the nation at the onset of independence.23 
Rushdie begins his book with a reference to the fateful moment when the birth of 
the promised independence is coupled with the tragedy of the partition of India and 
Pakistan: 
 
I was born in Doctor Narlikar's Nursing Home on August 15th, 1947. 
And the time? The time matters, too. Well then: at night [...]. On the 
stroke of midnight, as a matter of fact. Clock-hands joined palms in 
                                                 
22 See Guenther D. Sontheimer and Hermann Kulke (1989) for an excellent report on the 
various schools engaged in this debate. For a discussion of the traditional ability of 
Hinduism to celebrate its plurality rather than engaging in the creation of an exclusive and 
collective social vision, see Michaels (1998: 458). 
23 References to the concept are many, see for example Bhabani Sen Gupta (1996) who 
speculates about the continuity in basic values between the Midnight's Children and their 
elders. 
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respectful greeting as I came. [...] at the precise instant of India's 
arrival at independence, I tumbled forth into the world. [...] A few 
seconds later, may father broke his big toe; but his accident was a 
mere trifle when set beside what had befallen me in that benighted 
moment, because thanks to the occult tyrannies of those blandly 
saluting clocks I had been mysteriously handcuffed to history, my 
destinies indissolubly chained to those of my country (1982). 
  
The fictive life of Rushdie's protagonist is of course only a literary device for the 
depiction of the career of the post-colonial state and the promise of nationhood 
with which it was launched. As the story unfolds, we find the youthful dreams of 
Naseem, the prototype post-independence figure, entitled by his own reckoning to 
joy and fulfilment, turning sour. Rushdie's narrative ends with an agonising 
admission of the defeat of an ideal, of a botched project of nation building in South 
Asia. The promised nation, pure and pristine in its potential form, underpinning the 
rhetoric of the leaders of the freedom movement, turns into chutney - an eclectic 
collections of bits casually thrown together. Rushdie's indictment of those 
responsible for it is laced with rage and disenchantment: 
 
What is required for chutnification? Raw materials, obviously - fruit, 
vegetables, fish, vinegar, spices. Daily visits from Koli women with 
their saris hitched up between their legs. Cucumbers aubergines mint. 
But also: eyes, blue as ice, which are undeceived by the superficial 
blandishments of fruit - which can see corruption beneath citrus-skin; 
fingers which, with featheriest touch, can probe the secret inconstant 
hearts of green tomatoes: and above all a nose capable of discerning 
the hidden languages of what-must-be-pickled, its humours and 
messages and emotions [...] at Braganza Pickles, I supervise the 
production of Mary's legendary recipes; but there are also my special 
blends, in which, thanks to the powers of my drained nasal passages, I 
am able to include memories, dreams, ideas, so that once they enter 
mass-production all who consume them will know what pepper pots 
achieved in Pakistan, or how it felt to be in the Sundarbans [...] 
believe don't believe but it is true. Thirty jars stand upon a shelf, 
waiting to be unleashed upon the amnesiac nation (1982: 460). 
 
Rushdie's is clearly a search for a Kulturnation, which, four decades since 
independence (at the time of the writing) continued to be a chimera. But, is the 
Kulturnation the only kind possible? Is a multicultural nation, drawing on a plural 
society sharing a common geographic space, merely an Ersatznation - far from the 
real thing - and not an organic entity in its own right, a robust political construct 
that is capable of drawing on the contradictions of pre-colonial and colonial 
histories, religious diversity and the plurality of regional and local traditions? 
 But Rushdie's was not the only voice of pessimism. Predating him by over two 
decades was Selig Harrison, one of the early pessimists about India's chances of 
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giving concrete shape to India's cultural diversity within the framework of a liberal 
democratic state spelt out his doubts in the following words: 
 
India's struggle for national survival is a struggle against herself. As a 
civilization and as an integrated cultural whole, India has shown a 
power of survival rivalled only by China. But multilingual India's 
separate territories have failed as consistently as Europe's to hold 
together as a separate political unity [...] India is a whole world placed 
at close quarters. Nowhere do so many linguistically differentiated 
peoples, all of them so self-aware, all numbered in millions and tens 
of millions, confront each other within a single national body politics. 
The prospect that 'anarchy' , 'fascism’, and 'totalitarian small 
nationalities' will each torture this body politic, at one time or another 
in the decades ahead, is a measure not of some endemic Indian 
incapacity but of the challenge built into Indian nationalism (Harrison 
1960: 4). 
 
From this pessimistic prognosis, Harrison deduced two possible outcomes. Either, in 
their earnest desire to build a national state, India's leaders would concentrate power 
so that state-formation would entail the creation of a culturally unitary state that would 
pulverise local, regional and communal differences, or, India would fall apart under 
the strain of centrifugal forces, generated by diverse cultural groups having to function 
as parts of one political system: 
 
[...] Indian nationalism will most probably survive at the price of a series 
of authoritarian political forms, a conclusion which suggests that we are 
riding for a fall [...]. Deep-seated centrifugal forces on the one hand, and 
the quite contradictory urge for unified national power in the face of the 
unity of others, will act and interact too convulsively to leave India's 
present Constitution undisturbed. This interaction between extremes is 
characteristic of 'the most dangerous decades' those decades after an 
underdeveloped country has discovered progress, or the hope of 
progress, but before progress comes rapidly enough to satisfy rising 
aspirations (1960: 4-5).24 
 
The pessimistic prognoses of Rushdie and Harrison have not been borne out by the 
experience with democracy, state formation and national integration over the past 
five decades. The next section would show how the steel frame of the Raj - the 
police and the bureaucracy - have held, thanks to the infusion of new blood, and 
the democratic search for consensus, accommodation and good political 
management. While the conjectures about the state of accommodation of 
conflicting identities emerging out of indological and literary discussions provide 
us with rich insights into the political reality, their verification requires an 
empirical bridge into the inner world of the individuals. In the following section we 
                                                 
24 On this point, also see Huntington (1968: 55). 
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shall examine the nature of communal accommodation in India on the basis of the 
opinions and attitudes of survey data. 
 
T H E  D I A L E C T I C  I N T E R A C T I O N  O F  C U L T U R A L  E S S E N C E  
A N D  I N D I V I D U A L  P R E F E R E N C E S  
 
How should one recognise the theoretical categories through which one studies 
cultures and religions in the everyday life of the individual? The inner world of the 
individual is the meeting point of large categories, where they are occasionally 
conflated and transformed and recast in radically different forms. Mass democracy 
where the ballot paper is a vital instrument of both identity and welfare is no great 
respecter for theoretical purity in its use of abstract categories. What the scientist of 
religion terms as a 'failure' is actually a success of the political process of a post-
colonial state in creating new, thin and broad categories of identity: 
 
Terms are intended for communication. Their purpose is to evoke in 
the listener a specific notion, the same notion the speaker has in mind 
and which should correspond to the reality which is to be conveyed. 
Therefore much of our intellectual and academic exchange depends 
upon the choice of terms and on their capacity to convey specific 
information with a reasonable amount of clarity. If everyone can 
derive different sets of meaning from the terms 'Hinduism' and 
'religion' these terms obviously fail to serve their purpose (Stietencron 
1989: 19). 
 
The main reason behind the success of national integration in India arises from the 
fact that conventional theories of nation-building and social change usually present 
cultural duality like locality and region as the first steps of an incremental and 
linear march towards the more general category of the nation that ultimately 
dissolves local, regional, social and cultural differences within a larger, 'national' 
identity. These, in the typical metaphor of the 'melting pot', are finally reconstituted 
in the form of a legally uniform, and culturally homogeneous citizenship. In spatial 
terms, the conventional theory of national integration implies the transformation of 
the specific to the universal, and the locality to the nation. What conventional 
theory does not clearly indicate is whether these concepts are to be seen in 
dichotomous terms, or as concentric circles, where the outer rings encapsulate the 
inner. Under the later formulation, social change adds successive layers to the 
multilayered political persona of the society in change, rather than necessarily 
fragmenting it in line with spatial and primordial divisions. The political salience 
of this theoretical question can be seen from the apprehensions of balkanisation 
which always accompanied the discussion of modernisation and social change in 
the relevant literature of the 1950s. However, the evidence that we have opinions 
and attitudes of the mass public in India, culled from a survey of the national 
electorate after the parliamentary elections of 1996, show an alternative theory of 
the accommodation of locality, region and different concepts of the nation into a 
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common political space.25 The detailed empirical analysis presented below draws 
upon the cases of value and identity conflict in Indian politics already mentioned 
above. 
 
C R O S S - C U T T I N G  V A L U E  C O N F L I C T  A N D  P A R T I S A N  
C O M P E T I T I O N  
 
The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 was one of 
the most important landmarks in Indian politics after independence. The world 
media and the Indian press have consistently focused on it as a key issue in Indian 
politics and a key indicator of civil society in India. The interesting point to note 
here is that contrary to speculations in the media, Hindu opinion is neither as 
homogeneous nor as hostile to Muslims as one is led to believe. This we can 
deduce from the response of Hindus and Muslims to four questions relating to the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque, the attitude towards Kashmir, Pakistan and 
separate Civil Codes for communities which will be presented below. 
 Interest in the data on the attitudes towards the destruction of the Babri 
Mosque arises from the fact that in view of the expectations aroused by the spectre 
of Hindu fundamentalism, not the least by Huntington's imagery about the clash of 
civilisations, one would expect an internally undifferentiated phalanx of Hindus 
(and Muslims) taking radically opposite stances. However, when the Indian 
electors (an overwhelming majority of whom are Hindus) were asked to pass a 
judgement whether they considered the demolition justified or unjustified, they 
have largely condemned the act as unjustified. Only 22.7 per cent of Indian 
electorate have found the act (demolition) justified. Against this, 38.1 per cent 
termed it as unjustified while a large group of 39.2 per cent either have not heard 
about this episode or failed to take definite position on it. Of all those who express 
an opinion on it, 63 per cent assert that the demolition was not justified. 
 People endowed with greater information and exposure constitute larger shares 
of those who have found the act unjustified. For example, people belonging to 
urban areas , highly educated, upper caste and upper class do not approve the 
demolition ( 50.3%, 59.6%, 46.6% and 40.7 % respectively, as compared to the 
Indian average of 38.1%). Considering the role these people play in opinion 
making these findings are very encouraging as far as secular credentials of the 
country is concerned. Similarly, party-wise analysis of justified and unjustified 
responses also does not show much polarisation on this line (see table 1). Except 
the Left Front (9.1 per cent) all other parties have significant shares of those who 
justified demolition. For example, as against 40.7 per cent of the BJP voters, 16.5 
per cent of the Congress, 24.1 per cent of the NF and 27.3 per cent of the BSP 
voters come from those who perceive the destruction as justified. More 
                                                 
25 The survey was conducted by the Lokchintan group of scholars based at the Centre for 
the Studies of Developing Societies in Delhi and other Indian universities in May-June 
1996, shortly after the parliamentary elections. A random sample of about ten thousand 
respondents, representing the Indian electorate was surveyed through face-to-face 
interviews. 
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importantly, as much as one-fourth (25.7 per cent) of the BJP supporters have 
condemned the act of demolition. If `don't know' and 'not-heard' cases are 
excluded all parties have sizeable proportions of support from both the groups. 
While larger share of justified category in the BJP support reflects its North Indian 
bias, a sizeable group of its supporters condemning the act which sets a limit 
beyond which the BJP cannot capitalise on its Hindutva stand.  
 
Table 1: Partisan Response to the Demolition of Babri Mosque 
 
Response INC BJP+ NF LF BSP Total 
Unjustified 42.9 25.7 48.2 54.9 26.7 38.1 
Don't know 8.0 11.4 7.6 9.2 19.9 10.2 
Justified 16.5 40.7 24.1 9.1 27.3 22.7 
Not heard about demolition 32.6 22.2 20.0 26.9 26.1 29.0 
 
People's response to an emotive issue like Kashmir also does not show any 
explicitly 'communal' bias in it. Partisan responses to question, People's opinion 
are divided on the issue of the Kashmir problem--some people say that government 
should suppress the agitation by any means, while others say that this problem 
should be resolved by negotiations. What would you say, should the agitation be 
suppressed or resolved by negotiations? are presented in table 2. Giving credence 
to their secular values, 33.4 per cent of Indian electors have rejected the option of 
suppressing the agitation by any means. Of the opinion holders, as many as 75.6 
per cent have suggested that the problem of Kashmir cannot be solved by using 
suppressive measures but by negotiations only.  
 Suggestion to resolve Kashmir problem through negotiations receives support 
from almost all relevant segments of the society. That is, roughly half of the urban 
population, upper castes and upper class are in favour of negotiation. The 
'communal' divide is quite slim: 31.3% of the Hindus support such a solution 
negotiation in contrast to 45.7% support from the Muslims. However, the 
maximum support it receives from the highly educated people (62.1 per cent) 
followed by urban dwellers indicating thereby a greater scope for a peaceful 
solution of the problem. 
 
Table 2: Partisan Opinion on Resolution of Kashmir Problem 
 
Response INC BJP+ NF LF BSP Total 
Negotiation 33.8 34.7 32.6 32.9 25.5 33.4 
Can't say 32.8 26.4 30.7 28.7 28.9 32.0 
Should be suppressed  9.7 17.5 11.0  4.9 14.3 11.1 
Not heard of Kashmir 21.2 19.8 23.3 32.2 30.7 21.6 
 
Like views on demolition issue, except the Left Front all other parties have, 
more or less, equal shares in those who support suppression of Kashmir 
problem by force. The BJP accounts for slightly above the average and the 
Congress falls slightly below it. But the fact that all parties have received 
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around one-third of their support from those advocating resolution through 
negotiations puts the problem in perspective. 
 The same positive attitude of religious and regional reconciliation within 
India is also reflected in attitudes towards Pakistan. Those who suggest that 
India should make more efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan 
outnumber those who suggest the opposite or do not have an opinion on the 
issue. If we exclude the don't knows, the percentage of those in favour of 
friendly relations goes up to 72 per cent. 
 
Table 3: India should develop friendly relations with Pakistan (do you agree or disagree?) 
 
Response INC BJP+ NF LF BSP Total 
Disagree 17.1 23.4 11.6 17.4 12.4 17.6 
Don't know / No opinion 37.0 34.5 36.6 37.3 37.6 37.9 
Agree 45.8 42.1 51.8 45.3 50.0 44.5 
 
People's views on Indo-Pak relations are positively in favour of negotiation. The 
people of India, by and large, want that the government should make more efforts 
to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. Not only that 71.7 per cent of the 
opinion holders support the development of friendly relations, but also the people 
who matter in building a national opinion have come forward to lend more support 
than the non-opinionated sections of the society. For example, against all India 
average of 44.5 per cent, urban dwellers (59.3 per cent), people pursuing high 
ranking occupations (61.8 per cent), well educated (68.2 per cent), the rich (49.8 
per cent) and the upper caste (51.9 per cent) have agreed to the proposition that 
India should make more efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. The 
Muslims, the worst sufferers from the hostility between the two governments, have 
supported this viewpoint overwhelmingly; 72.5 per cent of them want friendly 
relations with Pakistan, compared to 40.8 per cent for the Hindus and 44.5 per cent 
for the population as a whole. 
 The issue of a common personal law for all Indians was a major consideration 
for the Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose of drawing up the basic 
laws of the new Republic. The original provision for a fundamental right of all 
citizens for a common civil code was ultimately scaled down to a Directive 
Principle of State Policy (Article 44) which merely suggests that the state should 
strive to enact such a legislation in the future. The resistance that the idea of a 
common civil code received both during the constituent assembly debates and 
subsequently during the debate in the Parliament on the issue of the Hindu Code 
Bill in the 1950s shows the extent of potential support there was for a plurality of 
civil codes in India. Inadvertently encouraged by the official even-handedness 
towards Hindu and Muslim laws during the early years of colonial rule and the 
subsequent desire to see the unification of conflicting religious laws as part of the 
building of a Hindu nation, the debate eventually got enmeshed with the bigger 
debate of the reform of Hindu society. Finally, the issue of independence took 
precedence over the issue of social and legal reform and the consensus in the 
Constituent Assembly was to postpone such debates to the future. In more recent 
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years as our data show, there is a large measure of support for a plurality of civil 
codes than what is often thought to be the case, though few Indian leaders would 
perhaps go as far as Conrad to argue that ‘personal laws are part of the 'culture' 
guaranteed to any section of citizens by Article 29(1)’.26 
 In this context, it is interesting to note here that a significant percentage of 
Indians are willing to concede to each community the right to retain its own 
personal law in the areas of marriage and property rights. In order to measure 
attitudes towards Personal Law, the survey asked: Every community should be 
allowed to have its own laws to govern marriage and property rights. Do you 
agree or disagree? and the responses are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Views on separate Civil Code for every community by Party 
 
Response INC BJP+ NF LF BSP Total 
Disagree 29.9 36.5 29.4 22.1 30.4 30.4 
Don't know 23.8 22.9 28.5 18.2 24.8 25.1 
Agree 46.3 40.6 42.2 59.6 44.7 44.4 
 
The issue reflects the tensions regarding the unresolved issue of identity and 
nationhood in India. Proponents of an exclusive definition of nation in India plead 
for a uniform law on all aspects of life. This position, very strongly propagated by 
the BJP gets far less support than the more inclusive view of nationalism in India. 
An impressive 44.4 per cent of the total sample or 60 per cent of the opinion 
holders say that every community should be allowed to have its own laws to 
govern marriage and property rights. Against this, only 30.4 per cent say the 
opposite and the rest, that is 25 per cent fail to express any opinion on it. It is true 
that the Muslims have lent greater support (67.1 per cent) to the idea of having or 
continuing with separate Civil Code, but the fact that their stand is also supported 
by the majority community makes a strong case for continuing with present law. 
However, this has a caveat to it, that is like ‘Muslim Personal Law’, other 
communities would also like to enjoy autonomy, at least on governing their 
marriage and property rights. 
 Judging from the above, there is considerable support within the electorate for 
a multicultural nation based on negotiation and acceptance or difference in India. 
There is no denying the fact, however, that a communal divide exists between 
Hindus and Muslims with regard to the social and political issues that are vital to 
identity. To show the variation in the distance between Hindu and Muslim 
attitudes, their respective answers to the four questions are presented in table 5. 
The table reports responses of Hindus and Muslims to the four 'communal' issues 
discussed above and their responses to two other questions more specifically 
geared to the measurement of the sense of legitimacy and personal efficacy in 
Indian society. These indicators are measured on the basis of the following 
questions: Suppose there were no parties or assemblies and elections were not 
                                                 
26 Under Fundamental Rights the Constitution of India, 1950 (as amended) Article 29 (1) 
guarantees any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own to 
conserve the same; see Conrad (1995). 
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held - do you think that the government in this country can be run better? Do you 
think your vote has any effect on how things are run in this country or do you think 
your vote makes no difference? 
 
Table 5: Communal Polarisation and Political attitudes 
 
Response 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Hindu 31.6% 31.3% 40.8% 41.5% 68.2% 58.1% 
Muslim 86.3% 45.7% 72.5% 67.1% 72.2% 60.3% 
Key: the numbers 1-6 stand for the response to the questions: 
1. The demolition of the Babri Mosque (not justified)  
2. The resolution of the Kashmir problem (solved by negotiation) 
3. The development of friendly relations with Pakistan (agree) 
4. Separate Civil Code for every community (support) 
5. Approval of the democratic system  
6. Efficacy of vote (vote makes a difference) 
 
The process of accommodation of conflicting preferences within a larger political 
space described above has also been reported by Bailey on the basis of his 
fieldwork in Orissa as a process of accommodation and moderation based on 
strategic calculations of self-interest (Bailey 1996). But its occasional breakdown 
shows that the process is neither linear nor inexorable. Multicultural 
accommodation of conflicting identities in a macro arena is sensitive to the larger 
arena where it is ensconced and the larger networks from higher-level political 
processes that interact with the political actors of the local arena. An uncertain 
state contributes to the uncertainty of the multicultural solution in the local arena: 
the reverse is also true.27 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
In its attempts to understand the concept of multiculturalism in the context of the 
post-colonial state in India and to examine the potential for its actualisation, the 
essay has drawn on the religious and cultural plurality that underpins India's 
institutions and her political process. A deeper analysis of the spirit of tolerance 
and accommodation that characterises Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and the way 
these values have influenced the development of Islam and Christianity in India 
particularly after they have been delinked from state power is beyond the scope of 
this essay. The point remains, however, that the Indian voter, given his sovereign 
                                                 
27 In reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court which forbade the use of the word 
'Hindutva' under the ban on the use of religion for electoral purposes, the Indian Supreme 
Court came up with a landmark judgment. ‘It cannot be said that any appeal for votes 
wherein mention was made of 'Hindutva' is by itself sufficient to amount to an appeal for 
votes for the Hindu candidates on the ground of their religion and is a corrupt practice or 
creates enmity and hatred amongst different classes of citizens on the grounds of religion 
and community’. All India Reporter, vol. 83, 1996 April, pp 827. But the long arm of the 
law would be available to intervene should any party use religious for the explicit purpose 
of ‘promoting hatred or enmity between groups of people’ (ibid). 
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democratic right to define nation and state, has reinvented India's traditional 
multiculturalism which has made it possible for people of many religious, 
languages and opposing political views to live together during the past five 
decades.  
 The Indian project of multiculturalism, fuzzy and implicit before independence, 
and explicitly fuzzy afterwards, has drawn scepticism from theorists and men of 
letters alike. However, the politics of negotiation and contestation that Indian 
democracy has institutionalised has provided the requisite space in which different 
communities have come together and made a concerted effort to add their voices to 
the definition of the core values of the nation. The state has played a crucial role in 
this process. When the state has succeeded in providing direction and fairness in its 
role as arbiter in disputes, it has grown in stature and taken the project of 
multiculturalism further. Its failure to intervene and suggest a way forward has 
resulted in tragic outcomes. The accommodation of group identities and individual 
rights has been crucial. 
 The sense of empowerment that India's traditional plurality and modern 
democracy have provided to groups and individuals is the key to India's project of 
multiculturalism. Both overwhelming power and its opposite - abject 
powerlessness - hold the potential of bringing the project to a temporary abeyance. 
Long before India's independence and the formal consecration of the multicultural 
concept in the constitution, Forster gave voice to this relationship of power and 
identity in an evocative scene towards the end of A Passage to India where he re-
enacts the theme of race and culture under colonial rule. 
 The Muslim Doctor Aziz, freshly reconciled with the English school inspector 
Fielding, expands on his theory of how to accommodate Afghans in a future 
independent India with its inevitable Hindu majority.28 
 
‘India shall be a nation! No foreigners of any sort! Hindu and Moslem 
and Sikh and all shall be one! Hurrah for India! Hurrah! Hurrah!’ 
 
But that was not to be. Nature and race prejudice combine to foil what was meant 
to be a reconciliation of the two friends. Forster's prescient comments capture how 
the great chasm of power that separated the two friends also stood on their way 
from meeting as fellow citizens in a common, multicultural space. Not fully 
understanding the depth of Aziz's feelings and dismissing them as youthful ardour 
of his earnest Indian friend, the British school inspector ridicules his sense of 
nationalism which momentarily seals their separation. 
 
‘India a nation! What an apotheosis! Last comer to the drab 
nineteenth-century sisterhood! Waddling in at this hour of the world to 
take her seat! She, whose only peer was the Holy Roman Empire, she 
shall rank with Guatemala and Belgium perhaps! Fielding mocked 
again. And Aziz in an awful rage danced this way and that, not 
                                                 
28 The talk of Indian Muslims would have been pre-mature, considering the location of this 
novel in the pre first world war period. 
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knowing what to do, and cried; 'Down with the English anyhow. 
That's certain. Clear out, you fellows, double quick, I say. We may 
hate one another, but we hate you most. If I don't make you go, 
Ahmed will, Karim will, if it's fifty or five hundred years we shall get 
rid of you, yes, we shall drive every blasted Englishman into the sea, 
and then' - he rode against him furiously - 'and then’, he concluded, 
half kissing him, 'you and I shall be friends’. 
 
'Why can't we be friends now?' said the other, holding him 
affectionately. 'It's what I want. It's what you want’. 
 
But the horses didn't want it - they swerved apart; the earth didn't want 
it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single-file; the 
temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest 
House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau 
beneath; they didn't want it, they said in their hundred voices. 'No, not 
yet’, and the sky said, No, not there’ (1946: 289). 
 
Forster's poignant passage emphasises the difficulties of achieving a multicultural 
society under subjugation where overwhelming power of the English confronted 
the powerless Indians. Once agency and autonomy were restored after the formal 
end to colonial rule, India went back to a form of political transaction aimed at 
communal accommodation. In the political space of India, it is possible today for 
communities to form and dissolve, in order to re-emerge as part of other 
communities. Seen from a distance and over time, political transaction has taken 
manifold forms - ranging between voting and lobbying to protest movements and 
ultimately, violent conflict. These in turn have produced knowledge of what leads 
to violence, instilling in the process greater understanding and accommodation of 
cultural and religious differences. Castes, religious communities and ethnic groups 
are all impregnated by the spirit of transaction and coalition building. The result is 
a significant empowerment of minorities.29 In India's multicultural society, the 
members of different communities, castes and language groups have risen to the 
highest levels, in public office as well as in sports, films or academia.30 
 Thanks to the salience of coalition politics rather than party competition, the 
structure and process of Indian politics in the 1990s should have a familiar ring for 
those conversant with the politics of continental Europe. In consequence, compared 
                                                 
29 When asked ‘Suppose there were no parties or assemblies and elections were not held - 
do you think that the government in this country can be run better?’, 69% of Indians argue 
in the opposite. But the number of Muslims, at 72%, making the same argument in favour 
of retaining the democratic structure, is even higher than the average. 
30 The percentage of India's largest minority has actually grown since independence. That is 
more than what India's South Asian neighbours can claim. Ayodhya was of course the most 
tragic instance of the failure of the process of communal accommodation. That is all the 
more reason to take into account what has happened since. The nature of national reaction 
against the destruction of the Babri Mosque has significantly altered the strategic thinking 
of the main protagonists and has helped moderate opinion on both sides prevail strongly 
enough to revive the process of communal accommodation through transaction. 
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to before, the moderation of shrill ideological overtones as part of a search of a 
winning formula based on governance has become the new mantra of Indian 
politics. Having come to their own, the regional parties are increasingly self-
confident in terms of working out deals with one another as well as with national 
parties. The Congress is still suspect, but that may change once the after-glow of 
Congress hegemony has completely burnt out, leaving the Congress to behave 
much as any other political party. One sure sign of this is that the terms of political 
discourse are no longer mediated by the salient values that once defined the core of 
India's high politics. The 'regionalists' - which as a group draws in people from 
India's periphery, in terms of religion, elite caste-status or geographic distance from 
the centre- are able to generate a different construction of the nation-state that is in 
sync with the times in terms of being market-friendly, yet with a humane face. 
When speaking in the national mode, the regionalists do not count out the need to 
be well informed and decisive in defence of the security and integrity of the nation. 
But in terms of actual policies of the state, the regionalists are much more willing, 
and in view of its social base, able to listen to the minorities, to regions with 
historical grievances, to sections of the society that entered the post-independence 
politics with unsolved, pre-independence (in some cases, pre-modern) grievances. 
It is thanks to these 'regionalists' that the emerging multi-party democracy of India 
is not merely an anomic battle for power and short-term gain but the releasing of 
pent-up creativity and visions that provide a fertile and cohesive backdrop to the 
realignment of social forces. Far from being its antithesis, region has actually 
emerged as the nursery of the nation.31 
Two citations, one from an Oriya Member of the Parliament in the first Lok 
Sabha and forty years into time, another from Parkash Singh Badal, show a 
continuity of the inclusive, multicultural nationalism of India: 
 
‘My first ambition’, the Oriya M.P. said, ‘is the glory of Mother India. 
I know it in my heart of hearts that I am an Indian first and an Indian 
last. But when you say you are a Bihari, I say I am an Oriya. When 
you say you are a Bengali, I say I am an Oriya. Otherwise, I am an 
Indian’ (Misra 1955: vol. 1, col. 647). 
 
The same sentiments are expressed by Parkash Singh Badal, made in the 75th birth 
anniversary of the Akali Dal: 
 
‘Shiromani Akali Dal is a symbol of the aspirations and hopes of 
Punjab. The Dal has always struggled for human rights, Punjab, 
Punjabi and the rights of Sikhs. For this the Akali Dal has made 
innumerable sacrifices [...] we are committed to peace and shall not 
allow it to be disturbed at any cost. We have full faith in the 
constitutional method. We shall curb corruption and shall strive to 
give a clean government [...] when today we are celebrating our 75th 
anniversary we reaffirm our commitment to our goals. [...] now 
regional parties and national parties who believe in internal autonomy 
                                                 
31 See, Mitra and Singh (1999: 213 ff.). 
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for States are coming together. Akali Dal is very keen to co-operate 
with them’ (Chum 1996).32 
 
Though the essay is addressed primarily to the Indian case, the problem it is 
concerned with has deep implications for stable democracies of the west as well. As 
the problem of the Islamic headscarf in France, the issue of the Satanic Verses in the 
UK indicate, the issue of full integration of non-Christian permanent residents into the 
structure of law and full citizenship remains an open issue. On the other hand, though 
the essay argues that the combination of federalism and consociationalism has 
produced a powerful solution to the problem of the integration of different identities 
within a common structure in India, the issue of a common legal basis as the sine qua 
non of citizenship is still an important issue on the political agenda of India.  
 As the state in India crosses the mid-century mark in its steady, democratic 
progression, one can only hope that the accommodation of the conflicting pulls of 
regional and sub-national identities will lead to the banalisation33 of the concept of 
nationalism altogether. This can only happen if the multicultural nationalism of India 
gains wide acceptance as a core value of the state from both political actors and 
observers, and becomes an integral part of India's political process. The post-colonial 
state can then develop an agenda that asks for real sacrifice from individuals and 
groups in the name of the whole nation. It would produce the necessary room to 
manoeuvre for the creation of a public space in the domestic politics, and tap the 
creative forces of nationalism while restraining the tendencies that are destructive of 
political community.34 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Subrata K. Mitra (1997) for a further discussion of this point. 
33This is a concept that Michael Billig uses to stretch the concept of nationalism, ‘so that it 
can cover the ideological means by which nation-states are reproduced. To stretch the term 
'nationalism' indiscriminately would invite confusion: surely, there is a distinction between 
the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that handing unobtrusively outside the US 
post office; or between the policy of the Front National and the support given by the leader 
of the opposition to the British government's Falkland' policy. For this reason, the term 
banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established 
nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from 
everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged', 
in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established 
nations, is the endemic condition’ (Billig 1995: 6). 
34 In this sense, banal nationalism does not necessarily imply benign or effete nationalism. 
‘It would be wrong to assume that 'banal nationalism' is 'benign' because it seems to possess 
a reassuring normality, or because it appears to lack the violent passions of the extreme 
right. As Hannah Arendt (1963) stressed, banality is not synonymous with harmlessness. In 
the case of Western nation-states, banal nationalism can hardly be innocent: it is 
reproducing institutions which possess vast armament. As the Gulf and Falklands Wars 
indicated, forces can be mobilised without lengthy campaigns of political preparations. The 
armaments are primed, ready for use in battle. And the national populations appear also to 
be primed, ready for so support the use of those armaments’ (Billig 1995: 7). 
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